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The Effects of Voting Costs on the Democratic Process  
and Public Finances†
By Roland Hodler, Simon Luechinger, and Alois Stutzer*
Increasing the attractiveness of voting is often seen as a remedy for 
unequal participation and the influence of special-interest groups 
on public policy. However, lower voting costs may also bring less 
informed citizens to the poll, thereby inviting efforts to sway these 
voters. We substantiate this argument in a probabilistic voting 
model with campaign contributions. In an empirical analysis for 
the 26 Swiss cantons, we find that lower voting costs due to postal 
voting are related to higher turnout, lower average education and 
political knowledge of participants as well as lower government wel-
fare expenditures and lower business taxation. (JEL D72, H25, H75,  
I20, I38)
Democratic decision making in elections and referenda is characterized by unequal turnout as rich and well educated citizens are more likely to partici-
pate than their less privileged compatriots.1 Many students of democracy worry that 
this unequal participation translates into fiscal policies that are biased towards privi-
leged citizens (see, e.g., Lijphart 1997). Various institutional mechanisms have been 
proposed to achieve a more equal representation. In these proposals, voting costs 
figure prominently. Incentives for participation are expected to be higher with postal 
voting or forms of electronic voting involving lower costs for citizens, or with insti-
tutional mechanisms like compulsory voting that increase the costs of abstention.
However, voting costs may also work as a selection device bringing the confident 
citizens to the poll but not the uncertain ones. Lower voting costs may thus induce 
more people to vote who only have a diffuse understanding of what their preferred 
alternative is. The latter circumstances though invite efforts to influence these vot-
ers. Special-interest groups may offer more campaign contributions allowing parties 
1 Tingsten (1937, p. 155) was one of the first to provide systematic evidence that “the voting frequency rises 
with rising social standard.” Lijphart (1997) reviews many studies that document unequal turnout. 
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to try to sway these voters in exchange for rents or policies tilted towards these 
groups. Whether lower voting costs contribute to a better serving of citizens’ pref-
erences is thus far from clear.
In this paper, we scrutinize the argument that lowering voting costs might have 
unintended effects on political outcomes. We first analyze theoretically how voting 
costs affect the political process and, thereby, public finances. We base this analysis 
on a probabilistic voting model with campaign contributions similar to the models 
of Baron (1994); Grossman and Helpman (1996, 2001); and Persson and Tabellini 
(2000). In our model, political candidates choose their policy platform, which con-
sists of taxes and public expenditures directed towards the public and special-in-
terest groups, respectively. The latter can make campaign contributions to political 
candidates. Informed voters base their decision primarily on policy platforms, while 
uninformed or impressionable citizens base their decision primarily on political 
advertisements paid for by campaign contributions. Unlike in standard voting mod-
els, in our model citizens decide how much political information to acquire, and 
whether or not to participate in the election. We assume that the costs of acquiring 
political information are lower for better educated citizens. Further, citizens have to 
bear costs when voting, and we follow Matsusaka (1995) in assuming that the citi-
zens’ benefits from voting are higher the more confident they are of their vote choice.
In this model, better educated citizens are more likely to make informed decisions 
when voting, and they are also more likely to participate in the election.2 The com-
position of participants changes if technological innovations in the electoral process 
like postal voting decrease voting costs. Such innovations increase electoral partic-
ipation as well as the share of less educated and thus impressionable voters whose 
vote choice depends on campaigns rather than policy platforms. As a consequence, 
candidates propose platforms with higher rent payments to special-interest groups 
(or, alternatively, platforms with lower taxes for groups that lobby politicians).3 The 
effect of lower voting costs on expenditures targeted towards the public is ambigu-
ous in general, and negative with Cobb-Douglas preferences. Therefore, in contrast 
to what conventional wisdom suggests, our model shows that lower voting costs 
benefit special-interest groups, but may well harm all other citizens in society.
We empirically test the predictions of the model for a procedural innova-
tion that significantly reduces voting costs: postal voting. We thereby exploit the 
 quasi-random experiment provided by the staggered introduction of postal voting 
in the 26 Swiss cantons. Switzerland provides an attractive setting for the empirical 
analysis for two additional reasons: First, frequent direct democratic decisions at the 
federal level allow us to observe participation decisions and changes in characteris-
tics of participants at a higher temporal resolution than what is normally possible. 
2 Lassen (2005) offers evidence from a natural experiment that better-informed people are more likely to vote. 
According to Shue and Luttmer (2009), citizens with poor education and low incomes are more likely to misvote 
not only because they are poorly informed, but also because they have difficulties filling out the ballots. In particu-
lar, they document that minor candidates’ vote shares are much larger when their (random) placement on the ballot 
is adjacent to a top candidate; and that these vote gains are larger in precincts with a large fraction of people with a 
low socioeconomic status in terms of education and income. 
3 These results are consistent with the finding of Wegenast (2010) that interest groups are less influential in US 
states with highly educated and well-informed citizens. The latter result is also indirect evidence for the idea of 
impressionable voters. 
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Second, changes in participation decisions can translate into changes in cantonal 
fiscal policies due to the cantons’ high degree of fiscal autonomy.
The empirical analyses refer to the years 1980/1981 to 2007/2010 depending on 
data availability. First, we find evidence for a 5 percentage point increase in voter 
turnout with postal voting at federal ballots. Second, based on a series of  post-ballot 
surveys, we find that postal voting systematically alters the composition of the vot-
ing population. On average, voters have fewer years of education and know less on 
the ballot propositions (i.e., popular initiatives and referenda) they voted on once 
postal voting is introduced. Finally, we observe postal voting to lower cantons’ wel-
fare expenditures and business taxation. While these latter results might come as a 
surprise, they are consistent with our model allowing for a more favorable treatment 
of special-interest groups and less government expenditures targeted at the public in 
response to lower voting costs.
This paper contributes to four different strands of the theoretical and empirical 
political economy literature. First, it builds on the contributions of Baron (1994); 
Grossman and Helpman (1996, 2001); and Persson and Tabellini (2000) on the role 
of campaign contributions in elections. Due to its focus on fiscal policies, our model 
is probably closest to Persson and Tabellini (2000). The main differences to all these 
contributions are that we deviate from the assumption of full (or random) voting 
participation, and that we do not take the share of informed voters as exogenous.4 
This allows us to show that lower voting costs make campaign contributions more 
important and, consequently, special-interest groups more powerful.
Second, Meltzer and Richard (1981) contributed one of the most prominent mod-
els in political economics linking the composition of the voting population with 
public finances. Restricting government activities to redistribution financed by 
a proportional income tax, their model predicts that a stronger representation of 
low-skilled citizens in the political process leads to more redistribution. Empirical 
evidence for this prediction, often exploiting different extensions of the franchise, 
is rather mixed (see, e.g., Husted and Kenny 1997; Rodriguez 1999; Alesina and 
Glaeser 2004; Gradstein and Milanovic 2004; Stutzer and Kienast 2005). Our model 
offers a novel explanation for the lack of strong and unambiguous empirical support 
for the Meltzer-Richard hypothesis: The inclusion of poorer and less educated cit-
izens may have increased the clout of special interests to the detriment of policies 
benefiting the general population, including the newly enfranchised citizens.
Third, voting costs are a key ingredient in the rational choice model of voting par-
ticipation (Downs 1957; Riker and Ordeshook 1968). Our results shed light on the 
quantitative importance of transaction costs related to voting and offer complemen-
tary evidence on the consequences of postal voting on turnout (see also Luechinger, 
Rosinger, and Stutzer 2007; Funk 2010; Gerber, Huber, and Hill 2013). We go, 
however, beyond the previous literature by documenting the effects of postal voting 
on the composition of participants and public finances.
4 Strömberg (2004) endogenizes the share of informed voters in a probabilistic voting model with 
 profit-maximizing media. Prat (2002a, 2002b) and Coate (2004a, 2004b) provide microfoundations for the effect 
of political advertisement on voting decisions of imperfectly informed voters. We abstract from these interesting 
aspects of political advertisement as we focus on the effects of voting costs on fiscal policies rather than on why 
and how political ads work. 
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Fourth, higher abstention costs may in general have similar effects on voting 
decisions and fiscal policies as lower voting costs. Hence, our paper is also related 
to a recent empirical strand of literature that focuses on the effects of compulsory 
voting.5 León (2013) experimentally influences perceptions about fine levels for 
abstention around a change in voting laws in Peru. He finds that lower perceived 
fines reduce turnout, especially among voters with little political knowledge. 
De Leon and Rizzi (2014) exploit the fact that voting is compulsory in Brazil for 
citizens older than 18 years, but voluntary for the 16 to 18 years old. Using a sample 
of surveyed students from Sao Paolo, they find that compulsory voting increases 
turnout, but has no strong effect on political knowledge. The two studies can be 
linked to our model, which shows that voters’ average political knowledge depends 
on two factors: first the participation decisions of voters with different socioeco-
nomic backgrounds and, hence, information acquisition costs; and second the par-
ticipating voters’ endogenous information acquisition. In the empirical analysis, we 
thus estimate the total change in voters’ average political knowledge due to both of 
these factors. In contrast, León (2013) focuses on the first factor, and De Leon and 
Rizzi (2014) study the second factor.
Hidalgo (2010) and Fujiwara (2013) study the introduction of electronic vot-
ing machines in Brazil using the fact that electronic voting machines were first 
introduced in municipalities with a population size exceeding a particular thresh-
old. They both find that electronic voting machines reduce the number of invalid 
votes and, thereby, increase effective turnout. According to Fujiwara (2013), this 
effect is more pronounced in municipalities with high illiteracy rates. In addi-
tion, Hidalgo (2010) presents evidence that electronic voting machines reduce 
electoral fraud, and Fujiwara (2013) shows that a higher share of people living in 
municipalities with electronic voting machines lead to an increase in health care 
spending and utilization at the state level. Our empirical analysis is probably clos-
est to Fujiwara (2013), as he also studies the effect of a new voting technology on 
voting patterns as well as government spending. There are, however, some note-
worthy differences: Our setting allows us to study the change in the voting pop-
ulation using individual level data, while Fujiwara (2013) investigates a change 
in the share of valid votes at the municipality level. Moreover, we observe public 
finances at the subnational level at which the voting technology changed. More 
generally, our empirical part differs from contributions on compulsory voting in 
Brazil and Peru by studying a developed country with voluntary voting in which 
electoral fraud, illiteracy, and invalid votes play a minor role (with the share of 
5 In our model, higher abstention costs and lower voting costs even have identical effects on voting decisions 
and fiscal policies. Hence, we also contribute to the small theoretical literature on compulsory voting. Crain and 
Leonard (1993) discuss the effects of compulsory voting on public goods provision and rents to special-interest 
groups in different theoretical frameworks, while we study these effects in a formal and unified model. Börgers 
(2004) and Krasa and Polborn (2009) compare welfare under compulsory and voluntary voting in costly voting 
models in which only pivotal voters benefit from voting, thereby abstracting from the way candidates choose their 
policy platforms and the role of special-interest groups. Krishna and Morgan (2011) argue that compulsory voting 
has the drawback that preference intensities can no longer affect voting participation and, thereby, voting outcomes. 
This argument is loosely related to our general point that postal and compulsory voting may reduce the political 
knowledge of the average voter and, therefore, lead to inferior policy outcomes for the population at large. 
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invalid votes being 0.3 percent for an average ballot in our sample), and also by 
looking at unintended side effects.
Section I presents and solves our theoretical model. Section II presents the data 
and the results of our empirical analysis. Section III offers concluding remarks.
I. The Model
A. Setting
There are two candidates, a lobby group, and a measure-one continuum of citi-
zens. Each candidate  P ∈ {A, B} is office-motivated and chooses his policy plat-
form to maximize his winning probability  p P , where  p A +  p B = 1 . Platforms 
consist of public expenditures directed towards the public,  g P ≥ 0 , and rent pay-
ments to the lobby group,  r P ≥ 0 . These two forms of public expenditures are 
financed with a linear income tax, and the government budget must be balanced. 
Hence  g P and  r P determine the tax rate  τ P = ( g P +  r P )/y , where  y denotes average 
income. Candidates may differ in their policy platforms  ( g P ,  r P ) as well as in some 
predetermined, i.e., exogenous, positions.
The lobby group can make campaign contributions  c A ≥ 0 and  c B ≥ 0 to 
candidates  A and  B at increasing marginal costs, and it receives rents  r P from the 
elected candidate  P . Its utility is  Π( r P ,  c A ,  c B ) = J( r P ) −  ( c A +  c B ) 2 /2 , where 
 J′( r P ) > 0 and  J″( r P ) < 0 .
Citizens differ in their skills  α i , which may represent educational attainments or 
innate abilities. The distribution of  α i is given by  f  ( α i ) , with continuous density 
 f  ( α i ) and mean  α . For simplicity we assume  f(0) = 0 ,  f(1) = 1, and  f  ( α i ) > 0 
for all  α i ∈ [0, 1] . Skills  α i have two effects: First they determine citizen  i ’s income 
y i =  α i . Second they determine how costly it is for citizen  i to acquire political 
knowledge  q i ∈ [0, 1] . Citizens are either informed, in which case they understand 
the candidates’ platforms  ( g P ,  r P ) and their predetermined positions, or they are 
impressionable. The political knowledge  q i of citizen  i measures the probability that 
she is informed rather than impressionable.
If candidate  P is elected, the utility of citizen  i is
(1)   W i, P = W ( g P ,  r P ,  α i ,  σ P i ,  q i ) = u ( c P i ) + H( g P ) +  σ P i  
  +  I i (β q i − γ) −   q i 
2  ___ 
2 α i . 
The first two terms on the right-hand side reflect citizen  i ’s utility from private con-
sumption  c P i = (1 −  τ P ) α i and public expenditures  g P , respectively. We assume 
 u′ ( c P i ) > 0 ,  u″ ( c P i ) ≤ 0 ,  H′( g P ) > 0 and  H″( g P ) < 0 . We further assume that 
r( c P i ) ≡ − c P i u″ ( c P i ) /u′ ( c P i ) is constant and satisfies  r ( c P i ) ∈ [0, 1] . The third 
term,  σ P i , represents her utility from the predetermined positions of the elected 
candidate  P . We assume that  σ i =  σ B i −  σ A i is uniformly distributed in  [−1/(2ϕ), 
1/(2ϕ)] .
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The fourth term captures benefits and costs associated with voting.  I i is a dummy 
variable whose value is 1 if citizen  i participates in the election and 0 if she abstains. 
Some benefits from voting may well depend on the voter’s political knowledge, like 
the satisfaction of being confident to have voted in one’s own interest (Matsusaka 
1995).6 These benefits are  β q i . For simplicity, we set  β = 1 . The costs of complet-
ing and casting one’s ballot are denoted by  γ . These voting costs are relatively high 
when ballots must be cast at a polling station, but they decrease if postal voting is 
introduced. The last term captures the costs of acquiring political knowledge  q i , 
which are decreasing in skills  α i .
It remains to describe the voters’ decisions.7 We know that voter  i is informed 
with probability  q i and impressionable with probability  1 −  q i . Informed voters 
vote for candidate  A if  W i, A ≥  W i, B , and for candidate  B otherwise. The electoral 
decisions of impressionable voters are driven by political advertisements and policy 
irrelevant candidate characteristics. The share of impressionable voters who vote 
for candidate  A is  1/2 + ψ(Δc − η) , where  Δc ≡  c A −  c B .8 The remaining 
impressionable voters vote for candidate  B . Note that  ψ > 0 measures the effec-
tiveness of advertisements and, therefore, campaign contributions; and  η is a popu-
larity shock that is uniformly distributed in  [−1/(2λ), 1/(2λ)] .
Timing is as follows: First, the candidates choose their policy platforms. Second, 
the lobby group can make campaign contributions. Third, elections take place. The 
elected candidate then implements the announced platform. The appropriate solu-
tion concept for this sequential game is subgame prefect Nash equilibrium.
B. Discussion
We now discuss some of the assumptions made. Given utility function (1), the 
citizens’ marginal utilities of additional units of private consumption  c P i and public 
expenditures  g P will typically differ. Hence,  g P is not simply a transfer payment, 
but some publicly provided good.9 Moreover, the citizens’ utility from  c P i and  g P is 
additively separable, and  r ( c P i ) is constant. The model could be solved with more 
general utility functions, but these assumptions simplify the analysis. Furthermore, 
they still allow for popular specifications such as Cobb-Douglas preferences in log 
form, or the quasi-linear preferences used by Persson and Tabellini (2000).
In this model the slope of the Engel curve in public expenditures is  ∂ g P i /∂ α i = −u′ ( c P i ) θ/[αH″( g P )] , where  g P i is the level of  g P that maximizes citizen  i ’s 
6 In general, citizens also benefit from political knowledge if they are pivotal with nonzero probability. However, 
this probability is zero in our model in which there is a continuum of voters. 
7 We use the term “voters” to refer to citizens who participate in the election. 
8 Following Persson and Tabellini (2000) we could assume that impressionable voter  i votes for  A if and only if 
Δc >  ε i + η , with  ε i being uniformly distributed in  [−1/(2ψ), 1/(2ψ)] . 
9 If  g P were simply a transfer payment, citizens would have extreme policy preferences: All citizens with an 
income below average would prefer a tax rate of one and all other citizens a tax rate of zero. To avoid such extreme 
policy preferences one needs either to assume that  g P is not simply a transfer as we do, or to add an endogenous 
labor-leisure choice as Meltzer and Richard (1981) do. 
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utility, and where  θ ≡ r ( c P i ) − 1 .10 Observe that the slope of the Engel curve 
has the same sign as  θ . The assumption  r ( c P i ) ≤ 1 , which implies  θ ≤ 0 , thus 
ensures a nonpositive relationship between a citizen’s skills  α i and her preferred 
level of  g P .
In our model higher skilled voters will optimally acquire more political knowledge 
because of lower information acquisition costs, which is consistent with empirical 
evidence that voters with better education and higher incomes are better informed 
(e.g., Benz and Stutzer 2004; Lind and Rohner 2013). Other mechanisms ensuring 
that higher-skilled citizens acquire more political knowledge would serve our pur-
pose equally well (e.g., Larcinese 2005). Similarly, our results do not depend on the 
perfect correlation between incomes and the costs of acquiring political knowledge. 
A negative correlation is, however, necessary.
We assume that the opportunity costs of voting are the same across individuals. 
If these costs were increasing in skills  α i , all our results would hold as long as the 
effect of political knowledge on voting benefits would be sufficiently large relative 
to the effect of skills on voting costs (see the analysis in the online Appendix). In 
the reverse case less skilled individuals would be more likely to vote. This pat-
tern of predicted turnout would be in stark contrast to the turnout pattern observed 
in reality.
The lobby group receives transfer payments in our model. In reality, lobby groups 
also get favors in the form of tax breaks. Hence, the rents  r P could represent tax 
reductions for the lobby group instead of transfer payments. We discuss this alterna-
tive interpretation of our model at the end of Section IC.
C. Equilibrium Analysis
In this section, we first derive the decisions of the citizens and the lobby group, 
which yield the candidates’ objective function. We then study how changes in vot-
ing costs affect the candidates’ policy platforms in two simplified versions of our 
model. Finally, we look at the complete model introduced above, and discuss how 
changes in voting costs affect the equilibrium policy platforms as well as the wel-
fare of the citizens.
Decisions of citizens and Lobby Group.—We start by looking at citizens’ deci-
sions of how much political knowledge  q i to acquire, and whether or not to par-
ticipate in the election. For citizens who abstain from voting, acquiring political 
knowledge has no benefits. Hence they choose  q i = 0 . Citizens who participate 
in the election choose  q i to maximize  q i −  q i 2 / (2 α i ) . Hence they choose  q i =  α i . 
Citizens therefore acquire political knowledge  q i =  α i and participate in the 
election if  α i − γ −  ( α i ) 2 / (2 α i ) =  α i /2 − γ ≥ 0 , i.e., if  α i ≥ 2γ , while they 
acquire no political knowledge and abstain from voting otherwise. The election par-
ticipation threshold  2γ directly determines voter turnout  1 − f(2γ) . We focus on 
10 The first-order condition  −u′ ( c P i ) (∂ c P i /∂ τ P ) (∂ τ P /∂ g P ) +  H ′ ( g P ) = 0 , where  ∂ c P i /∂ τ P = − α i and 
 ∂ τ P /∂ g P = 1/α , determines  g P i . The implicit function theorem then implies  ∂ g P i /∂ α i = −u′ ( c P i ) θ/[αH″( g P )] . 
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cases in which  γ ∈  (0, 1/2) , such that marginal changes in voting costs  γ have an 
effect on voter turnout and equilibrium policy platforms. It directly follows:
PROPOSITION 1: Lower voting costs  γ increase voter turnout.
The voters’ average skills and their average political knowledge are both equal to 
∫ 2γ 1  α i  f  ( α i ) d α i /[1 − f(2γ)] . Therefore:
PROPOSITION 2: Lower voting costs  γ reduce voters’ average skills and their 
average political knowledge.
We next derive the expected election outcome as a function of the candidates’ 
platforms, and the campaign contributions. Informed voters vote for candidate 
 A if  ΔV  ( α i ) ≡ u ( c A i ) − u ( c B i ) + H( g A ) − H( g B ) >  σ i and for  B otherwise. 
Among informed voters with  α i ≥ 2γ , the share voting for  A is therefore  1/2 + 
ϕΔV  ( α i ) .11 By assumption, the share of impressionable voters voting for  A is 
1/2 + ψ(Δc − η) for any  α i ≥ 2γ . As the share of voters with skills  α i ≥ 2γ 
who is informed equals  q i =  α i , the population share who votes for  A thus adds up 
to  π A =  ∫ 2γ 1 [1/2 +  α i ϕΔV  ( α i ) +  (1 −  α i ) ψ(Δc − η)] f  ( α i ) d α i , and the popu-
lation share who votes for  B to  π B = 1 − f(2γ) −  π A . Candidate  A therefore wins 
if and only if  ∫ 2γ 1 [ α i ϕΔV  ( α i ) +  (1 −  α i ) ψ(Δc − η)]  f  ( α i ) d α i ≥ 0 . Hence his 
winning probability is








(3) =  1 _
2
+  λϕ  ∫ 2γ 1  α i ΔV  ( α i  )  f  ( α i  ) d α i    ___________________ψ  ∫ 2γ 1 (1 −  α i  )  f  ( α i  ) d α i  + λΔc .
We now turn to the lobby group’s decision. The lobby group chooses campaign 
contributions  c A and  c B to maximize its expected utility  p A J( r A ) + (1 −  p A )J( r B ) −  ( c A +  c B ) 2 /2 , thereby anticipating the effects of  c A and  c B on  p A . The lobby 
group supports no candidate if rents  r A and  r B coincide, and the candidate prom-
ising more generous rents otherwise. It is easy to see that the lobby group chooses 
c A = max {0, λ[J( r A ) − J( r B )]} and  c B = max {0, λ[J( r B ) − J( r A )]} , such that Δc = λ[J( r A ) − J( r B )] . Inserting this expression for  Δc into equation (3) leads to
(4)  p A =  1 _2 +  
λϕ  ∫ 2γ 1  α i ΔV  ( α i  ) f  ( α i  ) d α i    ___________________ψ  ∫ 2γ 1 (1 −  α i  ) f  ( α i  ) d α i  +  λ 
2 [J( r A ) − J( r B )] . 
11 More generally, this share is  min {max {0, 1/2 + ϕΔV  ( α i ) } , 1} , but for simplicity we assume that it is 
strictly between zero and one. We make similar (implicit) assumptions for all vote shares and winning probabilities 
below. 
VoL. 7 no. 1 149hodler et al.: the effects of voting costs
Candidate  A anticipates the behavior of the lobby group and the citizens, and 
chooses his policy platform  ( g A ,  r A ) to maximize his winning probability  p A . 
Candidate  B chooses  ( g B ,  r B ) to maximize  p B = 1 −  p A . It follows from 
 equation (4) and the definition of  ΔV  ( α i ) that each candidate’s optimal platform is 
independent of his opponent’s platform, and that each candidate solves the maximi-
zation problem
(5)  max  g P ,  r P 
   ∫ 2γ 1 [ α i u ( c P i ) +  α i H( g P ) +  (1 −  α i ) ΩJ( r P )] f  ( α i ) d α i , 
where  Ω ≡ ψλ/ϕ , subject to  g P ≥ 0 ,  r P ≥ 0 ,  c P i = (1 −  τ P ) α i and  τ P = ( g P +  r P )/α ≤ 1 . We assume throughout that the solution is interior. As it is 
standard in this type of lobbying models, the two candidates’ platforms coincide in 
equilibrium, such that the lobby group makes no campaign contributions even if the 
candidates offer rents  r P > 0 .
Policy Platforms when rents Are Exogenous (or Absent).—We now look at a sim-
plified version of our model in which rents  r P are exogenous and equal to  ¯  r ∈ [0, α) . 
This simplified version includes the special case in which there are no rents. The 
model might be close to the one that some of the proponents of eased voting or com-
pulsory voting have in mind, and it indeed helps to understand why these procedural 
changes could potentially benefit citizens with low incomes.
In this simplified version of the model, the two endogenous fiscal policy variables, 
g P and  τ P , are tied together by the government’s budget constraint. Hence candi-
dates have effectively only one choice, and the maximization problem (5) reduces to
(6)  max  g P  
   ∫ 2γ 1  α i [u ( c P i ) + H( g P )] f  ( α i ) d α i 
with  c P i = (1 −  τ P ) α i and  τ P = ( g P +  ¯  r )/α . It follows:12
PROPOSITION 3: Assume  r P =  ¯  r . Then lower voting costs  γ increase the expendi-
tures directed towards the public  g P and the tax rate  τ P if  θ < 0 , but have no effect 
on  g P and  τ P if  θ = 0 .
The intuition is the following. Lower voting costs  γ increase voter turnout and lower 
the average voter’s income as well as the average informed voter’s income. Since 
voters with lower incomes prefer higher public expenditures  g P as long as  θ < 0 , the 
candidates respond to the lower income of the average informed voter by increasing 
g P . This is very similar to the mechanism modeled in Meltzer and Richard (1981).
Policy Platforms when the Tax rate Is Exogenous.—We now look at a simplified 
version of our model in which the tax rate is exogenous and equal to   ¯  τ ∈ (0, 1] , 
12 Proofs of Propositions 3 to 5 are in the Appendix. 
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reflecting the situation in countries (or cantons) in which governments are substan-
tially less constrained in how they allocate public spending than in the amount they 
can spend. In addition, it nicely illustrates the main mechanism by which lower 
voting costs can lead to policy changes that make all citizens worse off.
The two endogenous fiscal policy variables are again tied together by the govern-
ment’s budget constraint. The maximization problem (5) therefore reduces to
(7)  max  g P  
   ∫ 2γ 1 [ α i H( g P ) +  (1 −  α i ) Ω J( r P )] f  ( α i ) d α i 
with  r P =  ¯  τα −  g P . It follows:
PROPOSITION 4: Assume  τ P =  ¯  τ. Then lower voting costs  γ decrease the expen-
ditures directed towards the public  g P , and increase rents  r P .
To understand these results note that for any given tax rate  ¯  τ , all citizens have the 
same policy preferences: they want the expenditures directed towards the public  g P 
to be as high as possible. Hence, lowering voting costs  γ would have no effect on 
equilibrium policies if the new voters were equally well informed as those who partic-
ipated anyway. However, these new voters are less skilled and, therefore, acquire less 
political knowledge even when they participate in the election. As a consequence, the 
average voter’s political knowledge decreases. The candidates optimally respond by 
increasing rents  r P and lowering  g P , as rents serve to win votes from impressionable 
voters while public expenditures directed towards the public serve to win votes from 
informed voters. Hence, when the tax rate is exogenous, lower voting costs lead to 
policy changes that benefit the lobby group at the expense of all citizens.
Equilibrium Policy Platform.—In this section, we derive the equilibrium of the 
complete model introduced in Section IA, in which the fiscal policy variables  g P ,  r P , 
and  τ P = ( g P +  r P )/α are all endogenous. It follows from the candidates’ maxi-
mization problem (5):
PROPOSITION 5: Lower voting costs  γ increase the tax rate  τ P , the size of govern-
ment  g P +  r P , and the rents  r p . further, lower voting costs  γ increase the expendi-
tures directed towards the public  g P if  θ = −1 , but decrease  g P if  θ = 0 .
We discuss the effects of lower voting costs  γ on the different fiscal policy vari-
ables in turn, starting with their effects on the tax rate  τ P , which is proportional to 
the size of government  g P +  r P . There are two reasons why a decrease in  γ leads to 
a higher tax rate  τ P . First, as shown in Proposition 3, for any given  r P , a decrease in γ and the resulting decrease in the average informed voter’s income make it optimal 
for the candidates to choose a higher tax rate  τ P . This puts some upward pressure on τ P . Second, a decrease in  γ reduces the share of informed voters among the voting 
population. A higher tax rate  τ P has the advantage that it allows to increase  g P or 
r P and, thereby, to raise electoral support from informed or impressionable voters, 
respectively. But a higher  τ P has the disadvantage that it lowers private consumption 
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c P i of all citizens. This, however, only reduces the electoral support from informed 
voters. Hence, when the share of informed voters decreases, the candidates become 
less concerned about the disadvantage of high taxes, while the advantage of high 
taxes remains similarly attractive. This puts additional upwards pressure on  τ P .
We now turn to the effects of lower voting costs  γ on the rents  r P paid to the 
lobby group. We know from Proposition 4 that a decrease in  γ and the associated 
increase in the share of impressionable voters increases rents  r P relative to public 
expenditures directed towards the public  g P for any tax rate  τ P ; and from above that 
a decrease in  γ increases  τ P . Hence, lower voting costs  γ lead to more generous 
rents  r P , because a higher share of impressionable voters tilts both the size and the 
composition of public spending to the lobby group’s benefit.
It remains to discuss how lower voting costs  γ affect expenditures directed 
towards the public  g P . There are two countervailing effects: First, candidates would 
like to choose higher  g P when  γ decreases, because the average informed voter 
then earns a lower income and, therefore, prefers higher  g P for given  r P (as seen in 
Proposition 3). Second, candidates would like to choose lower  g P when  γ decreases, 
because informed voters also care about low tax rates  τ P , with the marginal utility 
of  τ P being negative and decreasing, and because the decrease in  γ already puts 
upwards pressure on  τ P by increasing rents  r P (as seen above). Any of these two 
effects may dominate in general.
Proposition 5 however shows that the net effect is unambiguous for some values 
of the Engel curve parameter  θ . Given  θ close or equal to zero, as in the case of 
Cobb-Douglas preferences in log form, citizens with different incomes prefer sim-
ilar or even the same level of  g P . The first of the countervailing effects discussed 
above becomes therefore negligible, and the candidates choose lower  g P when  γ 
decreases. Given  θ close or equal to minus one, as in the case of quasi-linear prefer-
ences, the marginal utility of  τ P is constant. The second of the countervailing effects 
discussed above becomes therefore negligible, and the candidates choose higher  g P 
when  γ decreases. Given  θ ∈ (−1, 0) , the effect of  γ on  g P does not only depend 
on the Engel curve parameter  θ , but, among others, also on the shape of  H( g P ) and 
the costs of knowledge acquisition.13
Finally, let us look at the welfare of citizens and the lobby group. The lobby 
group only cares about high rents  r P . As lower voting costs  γ increase  r P , they make 
the lobby group better off. Lower voting costs  γ also have a direct positive effect 
on the welfare of voters. The indirect effects, however, are less clear-cut: Citizens 
prefer high expenditures directed towards the public  g P and low tax rates  τ P , and the 
importance they assign to the former relative to the latter decreases in their income. 
Lowering  γ always increases  τ P , while the effect on  g P is ambiguous. Hence, when 
lowering  γ increases  g P , then the welfare effects of the associated policy changes 
depend on the citizens’ income. Citizens with low incomes are better off as they 
primarily care about high  g P , while citizens with high incomes are worse off as 
13 The costs of knowledge acquisition, which are inversely proportional to skills  α i , determine how the fraction 
of impressionable voters changes in response to lower voting costs  γ . The change in the fraction of impressionable 
voters, in turn, is crucial for the strength of the second of the countervailing effects discussed above: The larger the 
increase in this fraction is, the larger is the increase in  r P and, therefore, the upward pressure on  τ P . 
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they primarily care about low  τ P . But when lowering  γ reduces  g P , then the policy 
changes in response to lower voting costs make all citizens worse off.
An Alternative Interpretation.—As mentioned in Section IB, the lobby group 
may receive favors in the form of a tax break rather than transfer payments. We 
thus provide an alternative interpretation of our model. Assume that the lobbyists 
need to pay taxes  T −  r P , where  T is exogenous and where  r P represents benefits 
in the form of tax reductions. In this interpretation of the model, the size of gov-
ernment (measured in terms of public expenditures or revenues) is  g P instead of 
g P +  r P , and the tax rate on citizens’ income  τ P = ( g P +  r P − T)/y instead of 
 τ P = ( g P +  r P )/y . It is straightforward to show that Proposition 5 still holds. 
However, its implications change: it now implies that lower voting costs increase 
the lobbyists’ tax reduction  r P , but have an ambiguous effect on the expenditures 
directed towards the public  g P and the size of government.
II. Empirical Analysis
In the following, we test the predictions of our theoretical model and study how 
a reduction in voting costs due to the introduction of unrestricted optional postal 
voting affected the political process and fiscal outcomes in the 26 Swiss cantons.
A. Empirical Strategy
For the identification of the effects of postal voting, we exploit the quasi-random 
experiment provided by the staggered introduction of postal voting in the cantons. 
Importantly, the cantons’ regulations of the voting process are also applicable for 
votes on the federal level. This allows us to draw on sources of information on the 
political process at the cantonal and the federal level to test our theoretical predic-
tions. Our key identifying assumption is that cantons that introduced postal voting 
would have experienced the same changes in voter turnout, voter characteristics, 
and public finances as other cantons, had they not introduced postal voting. We deal 
with this key assumption in three ways. First, newspaper articles chronicling the 
debates on postal voting in Swiss cantons do not suggest that there were specific 
events facilitating or concurring with the adoption of postal voting. Proponents of 
postal voting generally argued with the need to increase participation and improve 
representation, while opponents worried about the loss of the social and ceremonial 
aspects of voting at the ballot. However, we were not able to reconstruct any reasons 
as to why some cantons introduced postal voting earlier than others. Exceptions are 
the two latecomers Ticino and Valais where worries about ballot secrecy and admin-
istrative costs, respectively, prevailed.14
Second, the timing of the introduction of postal voting seems unrelated to other 
institutional reforms and cantonal characteristics. Table A2 in the online Appendix 
14 See, e.g, neue Zürcher Zeitung, “Kantonale Volksabstimmungen vom 28. November,” November 20, 1993; 
neue Zürcher Zeitung, “Sorge um das Wahlgeheimnis im Kanton Tessin,” June 20, 1995; and neue Zürcher Zeitung, 
“Chronisch stimmmüde Walliser,” February 13, 2003. 
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indicates that none of the other democratic institutions considered important in our 
context (and taken into account in the empirical analyses below) were reformed in 
many cantons in the years around the introduction of postal voting. Table A3 in the 
online Appendix reports the result of a survival analysis. We use the same variables 
as in our main analysis, and subsequently augment the model with the share of citi-
zens speaking a Latin language and the seat share of left-wing parties in the cantonal 
parliament, lagged by one year. The language variable proxies for many stable cul-
tural differences and captures the fact that predominantly French and Italian speak-
ing cantons belong to the latecomers. The inclusion of the lagged left-wing parties’ 
seat share assesses whether changes in the political orientation of legislatures are 
related to the adoption of postal voting. A concern might be that our results for the 
fiscal variables could be driven by stronger right-wing parties introducing postal 
voting and reducing welfare spending. The results suggest that, once we control 
for stable cultural differences, only being in an election year seems to increase the 
hazard that a canton adopts postal voting at any point in time.
Third, we relax the common trend assumption to deal with potential unobserved 
forces. In particular, we estimate models with canton-specific time trends (both linear 
and quadratic) for all outcomes of interest. Moreover, when looking at education, our 
dependent variable is the difference in education between participants and the general 
population. This allows us to control in a very flexible way for trends in education in 
the general population that might be correlated with the introduction of postal voting.
Effects on voting participation are tested at the federal level. To test Proposition 1, 
we estimate the effect of postal voting on turnout on 90 different ballot dates involv-
ing 260 federal ballot propositions. To test Proposition 2, we use postvote surveys 
for part of these same federal ballots and isolate the effect of postal voting on partic-
ipants’ average years of education and ballot-specific knowledge.
We do not test Propositions 3 and 4 as they prepare for Proposition 5. Lacking a 
measure of rents to special interests, this latter proposition is difficult to test empiri-
cally though. We still explore aspects of Proposition 5 as formulated in our model and 
concentrate on welfare expenditures. We now refer to the cantonal level as we want to 
draw inference on variation in aggregate fiscal outcomes.15 Cantonal welfare expen-
ditures are interesting in our context for three reasons. First, they offer limited oppor-
tunities for discretionary spending and for targeting funds towards specific regions, 
industries, or groups. They are therefore unlikely to include rents to special-inter-
est groups (see Funk and Gathmann 2013 for a similar approach). This aspect dif-
ferentiates welfare expenditures from other important cantonal spending categories 
such as spending on education or health, which benefit the general population but 
also serve the interests of well-organized groups such as teachers and the health care 
industry. In Swiss cantons, welfare expenditures include primarily social assistance, 
 means-tested health insurance premium reduction, and supplementary benefits to the 
old age pensions and the disability pensions, but not expenditures for federal programs 
15 These outcomes are not directly related to the participation decision in the federal votes and the content of 
the federal ballots. However, they are shaped by the same forces of lower voting costs. Moreover, we expect that 
the voting population closely resembles the one at the federal level as cantonal elections and referendums are often 
held simultaneously with federal ones. 
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like  unemployment insurance. Thus, by using government welfare expenditures, we 
explore the possibility that lower voting costs result in lower government expendi-
tures targeted towards the public rather than towards special interests. Second, welfare 
expenditures benefit poor people, the supposed beneficiaries of reduced voting costs 
and higher voting participation. Welfare expenditures are, therefore, well suited to 
differentiate between our model and alternative theories, such as the Meltzer-Richard 
model, which predict that higher turnout should be associated with policy changes 
supporting poorer citizens. Moreover, potential effects on other spending categories 
benefiting the general population may be consistent with simpler explanations. For 
example, a reduction in education expenditures may simply result due to the fact 
that less educated individuals are mobilized. Finally, welfare expenditures amount to 
14 percent of all cantonal expenditures on average. Thus, it is an important spending 
category, in contrast to, for example, expenditures on the environment and land-use 
planning amounting to 3 percent of cantonal expenditures on average. As discussed 
at the end of Section IC, rents to special-interest groups may also take the form of 
reduced business taxes. Therefore, we additionally look at business tax rates.16
To summarize, we estimate variants of the following model:
(8)  y it = α Postal votin g it + β X it + γ  f i (t) +  μ i +  ν t +  ε it , 
where  y it are our outcomes of interest,  Postal votin g it is a dummy variable with value 
one for cantons and periods with postal voting and zero otherwise,  X it is a vector of 
time-variant covariates,  f i (t) are canton-specific linear or quadratic time trends,  μ i 
and  ν t are canton- and time-specific effects, respectively, and  ε it is an error term. The 
time-specific effects are ballot dummies when studying the voting process, and year 
dummies when analyzing welfare expenditures and business tax rates.
For the education and political knowledge regressions, our dependent variables 
are averages (or differences of averages) based on a varying number of respondents. 
Therefore, we use weighted least squares regressions with weights proportional to 
the number of observations used to calculate the dependent variable. To account for 
serial correlation, we allow for clustering at the cantonal level. The respective stan-
dard errors are reported in parentheses. Due to the relatively small number of cluster 
units (26 cantons), we also estimate standard errors using the wild cluster bootstrap 
procedure (using the ado-file provided by Malde 2012, which we slightly adapt for 
the weighted least squares regressions). The respective p-values for the coefficient 
on postal voting are reported in brackets. In simulations of Cameron, Gelbach, and 
Miller (2008) with 20 cluster units, this procedure even slightly under-rejects the 
null hypothesis.
16 In supplementary analyses included in the online Appendix, we also study the correlations between postal 
voting and participants’ income as well as total government expenditures and specific categories other than welfare. 
A useful line for further research would be the relationship to campaign spending. Given the available data, a con-
vincing empirical test for Switzerland is not feasible though. 
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B. Data
Our dependent variables are voter turnout, the difference in average education 
of participants and the general population, participants’ average ballot-specific 
 knowledge, welfare expenditures in percent of cantonal GDP, and business tax rates. 
Data for these variables comes from various sources.
The data on voter turnout comes from the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO). 
As there are usually several propositions at a particular date, we calculate average 
turnout per canton and ballot date.17 Voter turnout between 1980 and 2010 was 
44 percent on average and ranged from 14 percent to 87 percent.
Years of education and knowledge on a specific proposition are captured on the 
basis of postvote surveys. Different Swiss universities together with the private 
research institute GFS carry out postvote surveys after each ballot (VOX surveys). 
They are based on phone interviews within three weeks of the vote with represen-
tative samples of roughly 1,000 eligible voters (no voter registration is required 
in Switzerland). We use the standardized cumulative file VoxIt by Brunner et al. 
(2013). The sample period starts in 1981 and ends in 2010. The postvote surveys 
contain information on whether and how respondents voted, their knowledge about 
ballot proposals and their socioeconomic characteristics.
Respondents’ level of education is captured by the highest degree they attained. 
Based on information provided by the Swiss Conference of Cantonal Ministers of 
Education, we translate the degrees into years of education. Respondents’ knowl-
edge on the ballot proposition is expressed on a three-point scale. The respective 
variable takes value 0 for respondents who remember neither the title nor the content 
of the proposition, value 1 for respondents who remember one of these and value 2 
for respondents who remember both title and content of the ballot.18
We use the postvote survey data to calculate the differences in average years of 
education between voters and the general population for all cantons and ballot dates. 
Thereby, we can account for general cantonal developments in education in a flexi-
ble way. We also calculate the participants’ average knowledge on propositions. We 
do not take the difference to the average knowledge of all respondents since knowl-
edge is endogenous to the participation decision (as theoretically modeled) whereas 
education is exogenous to the participation decision. For some cantons and dates 
there are no respondents in the survey or, alternatively, no respondents who voted.
As can be seen from the descriptive statistics in Table 1, voters have a slightly 
higher level of education than the general population. The difference amounts to 
0.264 years (with the mean level of education being 12.605 years). Average knowl-
edge of participants is 1.619 on the three-point scale ranging from 0 to 2.
Annual data on welfare expenditures in cantons are from the annual publications 
of the Swiss Federal Finance Administration (FFA) on public finances (Öffentliche 
17 For a complete list of federal ballots, see the webpage of the Swiss federal chancellery at http://www.admin.
ch/ch/d/pore/va/vab_2_2_4_1.html (August 26, 2013). 
18 Knowledge of the proposition title is assessed based on the following question: “On [date], i.e., last or the 
week before last, there were federal votes. What were the issues, could you state them?” Detailed knowledge of 
the propositions is coded based on responses to the question: “[Number] votes were on the ballot, i.e., [title of the 
propositions]. Could you briefly describe what was called for?” 
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Finanzen der Schweiz, various years). The data is available until 2007. Expenditure 
data is based on new accounting standards thereafter and, therefore, not  comparable 
to the earlier data. On average, welfare expenditures amount to 2 percent of can-
tonal GDP.
From the Swiss Federal Tax Administration (FTA), we have data on the effective 
taxes a limited liability company has to pay to the canton and the municipality where 
it is headquartered. We use the effective taxes for capital and reserves of CHF 2 mil-
lions and net profits of CHF 400,000 (implying returns before taxes of 20 percent). 
For this combination of capital and profits, comparable data from 1983 to 2007 
are available. For the years 1980 to 1982, we use the effective taxes for capital and 
reserves of CHF 1 million and net profits of CHF 200,000. To calculate the cantonal 
tax rates on net profits and capital, we divide the effective taxes by the net profits. 
On average, this tax rate is 19 percent.
Table 1—Descriptive Statistics
Observations Mean SD Min. Max.
Panel A. Turnout 1980–2010
Turnout 2,340 0.437 0.114 0.138 0.872
Postal voting 2,340 0.572 0.495 0 1
Panel B. Education 1981–2010
Difference in years of education between 1,780 0.264 0.322 −3.750 5.200
 participants and the general population
Postal voting 1,780 0.668 0.471 0 1
Panel c. Knowledge 1981–2010
Average knowledge on propositions of participants 1,780 1.619 0.248 0.000 2.000
Postal voting 1,780 0.684 0.465 0 1
Panel D. Welfare expenditures and business tax rates 1980 –2007
Welfare expenditures (percent of GDP) 728 2.056 0.948 0.505 4.970
Business tax rate 728 19.0 4.2 6.7 32.8
Postal voting 728 0.505 0.500 0 1
Population in 1,000,000 728 0.268 0.280 0.013 1.323
Share under 20 728 0.247 0.033 0.157 0.337
Share over 64 728 0.150 0.021 0.103 0.210
GDP p.c. in 100,000 728 0.463 0.173 0.161 1.413
Unemployment rate 728 1.657 1.442 0.000 6.210
Election year 728 0.317 0.466 0 1
Fiscal rule index 728 0.429 0.913 0 3
Mandatory fiscal referendum 728 0.663 0.473 0 1
Signature requirement initiative, relative 728 1.469 0.981 0.003 3.851
Cabinet size 728 6.316 1.177 5 9
Parliament size 728 113.846 46.473 46 200
notes: Observations in panels A, B, and C are at the canton-ballot date level while those in panel D are at the 
canton-year level. The descriptive statistics in panels B and C are for weighted data with weights proportional to the 
square root of the number of observations on which the differences/averages are based.
Sources: Année politique Suisse, BAK Basel, cantonal constitutions, Feld et al. (2011), Funk and Gathmann (2011), 
Luechinger, Rosinger, and Stutzer (2007), Swiss Federal Finance Administration, Swiss Federal Statistical Office, 
Swiss Federal Tax Authority, Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, and Brunner et al. (2013)
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Our main regressor is a dummy variable for postal voting (Luechinger, Rosinger, 
and Stutzer 2007).19 With postal voting, eligible citizens receive the ballot forms 
unsolicited per mail. To participate, they can then choose between voting at the 
ballot box or sending the ballot forms back per mail. The dummy variable builds on 
 cantonal laws, information from the federal chancellery, and a survey conducted with 
the cantonal chancelleries. Since the late 1970s, Swiss cantons successively intro-
duced postal voting for all citizens without request, starting with Basel-Landschaft 
in 1978 and ending with Ticino and Valais in 2005. Table A1 in the online Appendix 
provides the introduction dates. In 23 out of the 26 cantons, the introduction of postal 
voting falls into our sample period. In regressions with annual data, the dummy vari-
able for postal voting is coded as one starting in the year of adoption if postal voting 
was introduced in the first half of the year, and starting in the year after the adoption 
if postal voting was introduced in the second half of the year.
Control variables are the cantonal GDP per capita, the population of a canton, 
the fraction of those below the age of 20 and those above the age of 64, and the 
number of registered unemployed as a share of the population aged 20 to 64. The 
GDP data is from the consultancy BAK Basel, the cantonal population data from the 
FSO, and the cantonal unemployment data from the State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs (SECO). In the welfare expenditures and the business tax rate regressions, 
we also include institutional and political variables that have been argued to affect 
fiscal policies. The variables are the cabinet size and parliament size, a dummy for 
election years (from the Année politique Suisse and the FSO), a fiscal rule index 
(from Feld et al. 2011), the signature requirement to launch a voter initiative, and a 
dummy for mandatory fiscal referendums (from Funk and Gathmann 2011 and the 
cantonal constitutions). The fiscal rule index captures the stringency of balanced 
budget rules, which differ in terms of deficit ceilings, sanctions, escape clauses, and 
other aspects (Feld et al. 2011). Mandatory fiscal referendums subject all new can-
tonal expenditures above a certain threshold to a popular vote.
C. Estimation results
In the following, we present our results on voter turnout, the voters’ education 
and political knowledge, and public finances.
Voter Turnout.—Table 2 shows the partial correlation between unrestricted 
optional postal voting and voter turnout at the level of Swiss cantons between 1980 
and 2010. Based on an ordinary least squares estimate including canton-specific 
and ballot date-specific effects as well as a set of time variant control variables, 
we find that postal voting leads to an average increase in voting participation of 
4.7 percentage points, or 10.8 percent relative to the average turnout of 43.7 percent 
in our sample. Specifications II and III additionally control for canton-specific linear 
and quadratic time trends to relax the common trend assumption. For postal voting, 
19 Luechinger, Rosinger, and Stutzer (2007) provide a detailed description of the introduction of postal voting 
in Swiss cantons, the construction of the respective dummy variable, and estimates on the effect of postal voting 
on turnout. The discussion in this section abbreviates the discussion in Luechinger, Rosinger, and Stutzer (2007). 
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the partial correlations remain robust, if anything they get slightly larger. All esti-
mates for postal voting are statistically highly significant whereby standard errors 
are adjusted for clustering at the cantonal level.20
Figure 1 visualizes the effect of postal voting on turnout. The figure shows the 
voting participation in the years before and after the adoption of postal voting. The 
estimates are based on regressions analogous to specification III in Table 2. The 
pattern clearly indicates that there is a sharp increase in participation with adoption 
rather than a preexisting upward trend. The evidence supports Proposition 1 and 
indicates that the reduction in voting costs due to the introduction of postal voting 
significantly increased turnout.
Education and Political Knowledge.—We estimate the effect on voters’ education 
with three specifications analogous to the ones of the turnout regressions. Since our 
dependent variable is the difference in average years of education between voters 
20 In most of the reported estimations, the p-values for postal voting based on clustering at the cantonal level 
and those based on the wild cluster bootstrap are close. Exceptions are the significant estimates for knowledge that 
become marginally insignificant with wild cluster bootstrap. 
Table 2—Postal Voting and Voter Turnout  
in Federal Ballots in Switzerland for 1980 to 2010
(I) (II) (III)
Postal voting 0.047*** 0.054*** 0.050***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Population in 1,000,000 0.072 −0.112 −0.030
(0.301) (0.125) (0.513)
Share under 20 0.694 −0.133 −0.635
(0.623) (0.571) (1.024)
Share over 64 −0.102 −0.792 0.662
(0.603) (0.758) (1.212)
GDP p.c. in 100,000 −0.013 −0.162* −0.032
(0.052) (0.087) (0.076)
Unemployment rate 0.006 −0.000 0.005
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
Canton-specific effects Yes Yes Yes
Ballot date-specific effects Yes Yes Yes
Canton-specific time trends No linear quadratic
Observations 2,340 2,340 2,340
Number of clusters 26 26 26
r2 0.74 0.78 0.79
notes: Dependent variable: Turnout [0–1]. OLS estimations. Average turnout amounts 
to 0.437. Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the level of cantons. 
p-values based on wild cluster bootstrap are reported in square brackets. 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Sources: BAK Basel, Luechinger, Rosinger, and Stutzer (2007), Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office, and Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
VoL. 7 no. 1 159hodler et al.: the effects of voting costs
and the general population, we also account for general cantonal developments in 
education.
According to the results in Table 3, postal voting is related, on average, to a 
lower education level of the participants in federal ballots. In specification I, the 
difference in average education is reduced by 0.067 years. While the effect of 
postal voting may seem small in absolute terms, it implies a sizeable effect of the 
treatment on the treated. As an illustration, if participation increases by 10.8 per-
cent with postal voting (as seen before), and the difference in average education 
thereby decreases by 0.067 years, the 10.8 percent extra voters must be character-
ized by 0.067/0.108 = 0.620 fewer years of education than the previous voters. 
The coefficient for postal voting is of similar magnitude with canton-specific linear 
time trends, but is reduced by roughly two thirds and imprecisely estimated with 
 canton-specific quadratic time trends.
Figure 2 indicates that the education level of voters relative to the general popula-
tion drops in the years after the introduction of postal voting. Ideally, we would like 
to see immediate changes in differences in education levels with the introduction of 
postal voting, matching the immediate increase in turnout documented in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Voter Turnout Before and After the Adoption of Postal Voting
notes: Coefficients (dots) and 95 percent confidence intervals (vertical lines) from an OLS 
regression of turnout on dummies for 6 different time periods relative to the introduction of 
postal voting and a set of controls for the years 1980 to 2010. The dummies have the value 
one for the time period indicated on the x-axis and zero otherwise, with the time period five 
or more years prior to the introduction of postal voting normalized to zero (dashed line). The 
set of controls is the same as in specification III of Table 2. Confidence intervals are based on 
a cluster-robust estimator for the variance-covariance matrix with clustering allowed at the 
cantonal level. Based on a Wald test, it is clearly rejected that the mean of the two coefficients 
capturing the four years prior to the adoption of postal voting are equal to the mean of the two 
coefficients for the four years after ( p = 0.000).
Sources: BAK Basel, Luechinger, Rosinger, and Stutzer (2007), Swiss Federal Statistical 
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However, the estimates for individual years are based on few observations and are, 
thus, relatively noisy. Nevertheless, the findings of Table 3 and Figure 2 provide 
considerable support for Proposition 2 that the average skill level of participants is 
lower with lower voting costs.
Table 4 reports the effect of postal voting on participants’ average knowledge on 
propositions. In specification I, we find that knowledge is statistically insignificantly 
lower by around 0.021 points on the three point scale, whereby the mean value of 
this variable is 1.619. Including canton-specific linear and quadratic time trends 
increases the magnitude of the coefficients to −0.034 and −0.057, respectively. 
Figure 3 suggests that there is no preexisting trend in voters’ knowledge before the 
introduction of postal voting. However, voters’ knowledge is reduced with the intro-
Table 3—Postal Voting and the Difference in the Level of Education  
between Participants and the General Population  
in Federal Ballots in Switzerland for 1981 to 2010
(I) (II) (III)
Postal voting −0.067*** −0.061** −0.023
(0.023) (0.026) (0.036)
[0.006] [0.031] [0.504]
Population in 1,000,000 1.165*** 1.016 1.065
(0.244) (0.927) (2.043)
Share under 20 −2.987** −1.454 −3.137
(1.431) (3.667) (12.535)
Share over 64 −0.457 −9.916 −24.748
(1.270) (8.968) (15.333)
GDP p.c. in 100,000 0.119 −0.320 −0.174
(0.157) (0.650) (1.254)
Unemployment rate −0.013 −0.005 −0.010
(0.019) (0.022) (0.029)
Canton-specific effects Yes Yes Yes
Ballot date-specific effects Yes Yes Yes
Canton-specific time trends No linear quadratic
Observations 1,780 1,780 1,780
Number of clusters 26 26 26
r2 0.13 0.14 0.15
notes: Dependent variable: Difference in the average years of education. Weighted LS estima-
tions. Average years of education in the sample population amount to 12.605 years. Weights are 
proportional to the number of observations used to calculate the dependent variable. Standard 
errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the level of cantons. p-values based on wild 
cluster bootstrap are reported in square brackets. The regressions based on the survey data have 
fewer observations than the turnout regressions in Table 2 because the sample starts only in 
1981, postvote surveys are missing for four ballot dates in this period, information on residence 
canton is missing for two ballot dates, and surveys do not contain respondents or participants 
from all cantons for some ballot dates.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Sources: BAK Basel, Luechinger, Rosinger, and Stutzer (2007), Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office, Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, and Brunner et al. (2013)
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duction of postal voting. This finding supports Proposition 2 of our model. It shows 
that lower voting costs can have unintended side effects.21
In additional regressions reported in the online Appendix, we find no differential 
effects of postal voting on the participation behavior of citizens with age 65 or older, 
men, or people from rural areas. Thus, our results for the main variables of interest 
do not seem to be driven by any of these sociodemographic factors.
Public finances.—Tables 5 and 6 present the results for the effects of postal vot-
ing on welfare expenditures in percent of cantonal GDP and for business tax rates.
21 Our theoretical model further predicts that political knowledge increases with education (or skills) condi-
tional on voting. This is indeed what we find: The average knowledge of voters monotonically increases from 1.54 
for individuals with nine years of education to 1.69 for individuals with 17 years. 
Figure 2. Postal Voting and the Difference in the Level of Education  
between Participants and the General Population
notes: Coefficients (dots) and 95 percent confidence intervals (vertical lines) from a weighted 
LS regression of the difference in average years of education between voters and the general 
population on dummies for 6 different time periods relative to the introduction of postal vot-
ing and a set of controls for the years 1981 to 2010. The dummies have the value one for the 
time period indicated on the x-axis and zero otherwise, with the time period five or more years 
prior to the introduction of postal voting normalized to zero (dashed line). The set of controls 
is the same as in specification III of Table 3. Weights are proportional to the number of obser-
vations used to calculate the dependent variable. Confidence intervals are based on a cluster-ro-
bust estimator for the variance-covariance matrix with clustering allowed at the cantonal level. 
Based on a Wald test, it is rejected that the mean of the two coefficients capturing the four years 
prior to the adoption of postal voting are equal to the mean of the two coefficients for the four 
years after ( p = 0.051).
Sources: BAK Basel, Luechinger, Rosinger, and Stutzer (2007), Swiss Federal Statistical 
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Welfare expenditures in percent of cantonal GDP seem to decrease after the adop-
tion of postal voting. A negative partial correlation holds in all three specifications in 
Table 5, but it is only statistically significant in specification III. The point estimates 
suggest that welfare expenditures are lower by between 0.072 and 0.144 percent-
age points. With welfare expenditures amounting to 2 percent of cantonal GDP on 
average, postal voting decreases welfare expenditures by 4 to 7 percent. Figure 4 
shows that welfare expenditures gradually decrease starting in the year postal vot-
ing is introduced until they reach a permanent reduced level 3 to 4 years after the 
introduction. This suggests that changes in the composition of voters induced by 
changes in voting institutions need some time to work through the political process 
to affect policy outcome and, therefore, that political outcomes gradually adapt to 
new equilibrium levels. Given that welfare expenditures are an important spending 
category and one that is directed towards the public but unlikely to include rents for 
special-interest groups, we see the evidence as consistent with the—probably most 
Table 4—Postal Voting and the Political Knowledge  
of Participants in Federal Ballots in Switzerland for 1981 to 2010
(I) (II) (III)
Postal voting −0.021 −0.034* −0.057**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.027)
[0.255] [0.112] [0.114]
Population in 1,000,000 0.448*** 0.123 1.336
(0.131) (0.344) (1.505)
Share under 20 −0.791 0.112 −2.067
(1.132) (1.388) (5.344)
Share over 64 −0.897 −6.293** −3.935
(1.296) (2.297) (7.366)
GDP p.c. in 100,000 −0.003 0.252 0.327
(0.110) (0.244) (0.324)
Unemployment rate −0.002 0.007 0.016
(0.012) (0.010) (0.012)
Canton-specific effects Yes Yes Yes
Ballot date-specific effects Yes Yes Yes
Canton-specific time trends No linear quadratic
Observations 1,780 1,780 1,780
Number of clusters 26 26 26
r2 0.75 0.76 0.76
notes: Dependent variable: Average knowledge on propositions of participants [0–2]. Weighted 
LS estimations. Average knowledge on propositions of participants amounts to 1.619. Weights 
are proportional to the number of observations used to calculate the dependent variable. 
Standard errors in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the level of cantons. p-values based 
on wild cluster bootstrap are reported in square brackets. The regressions based on the survey 
data have fewer observations than the turnout regressions in Table 2 because the sample starts 
only in 1981, post-vote surveys are missing for four ballot dates in this period, information on 
residence canton is missing for two ballot dates, and surveys do not contain respondents or par-
ticipants from all cantons for some ballot dates.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Sources: BAK Basel, Luechinger, Rosinger, and Stutzer (2007), Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office, Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, and Brunner et al. (2013)
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controversial—second case in Proposition 5 that lower voting costs decrease public 
expenditures net of rents.
The results for business tax rates in Table 6 indicate that postal voting is related 
to a lower tax rate of between −0.55 and −1.25 percentage points. Compared to 
an average business tax rate in the sample of around 19 percent, this amounts to a 
reduction of between 3 and 7 percent. While the overall pattern of the estimation 
results is consistent and in line with the alternative interpretation of our model, the 
partial correlations are imprecisely measured in most specifications. This is also 
reflected in Figure 5, which indicates a fall in business tax rates after the adoption 
of postal voting with point estimates characterized by wide confidence intervals. 
Nevertheless, the pattern fits the overall picture that the introduction of postal voting 
tends to favor well-organized interest groups, in our case business interests.
III. Conclusions
There is a common concern that voting costs with traditional voluntary voting 


















Figure 3. Postal Voting and Participants’ Average Knowledge on Propositions
notes: Coefficients (dots) and 95 percent confidence intervals (vertical lines) from a weighted 
LS regression of the average political knowledge of voters on dummies for 6 different time 
periods relative to the introduction of postal voting and a set of controls for the years 1981 to 
2010. The dummies have the value one for the time period indicated on the x-axis and zero oth-
erwise, with the time period five or more years prior to the introduction of postal voting nor-
malized to zero (dashed line). The set of controls is the same as in specification III of Table 4. 
Weights are proportional to the number of observations used to calculate the dependent vari-
able. Confidence intervals are based on a cluster-robust estimator for the variance-covariance 
matrix with clustering allowed at the cantonal level. Based on a Wald test, it is rejected that the 
mean of the two coefficients capturing the four years prior to the adoption of postal voting are 
equal to the mean of the two coefficients for the four years after ( p = 0.043).
Sources: BAK Basel, Luechinger, Rosinger, and Stutzer (2007), Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office, Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs, and Brunner et al. (2013)
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making. Moreover, these costs contribute to an unequal representation with the better 
educated being more likely to participate. Accordingly, the plea is for lower voting 
costs (or compulsory voting). However, lower voting costs involve a trade-off: While 
they may reduce the representation bias, they may simultaneously lower the average 
participants’ political knowledge and increase the bias from  interest-group politics.
We substantiate this argument offering a theoretical model and empirical evi-
dence. In particular, we study how lower voting costs affect public goods provision 
Table 5—Postal Voting and Welfare Expenditures  
of Swiss Cantons for 1980 to 2007
(I) (II) (III)
Postal voting −0.102 −0.072 −0.144**
(0.064) (0.074) (0.061)
[0.143] [0.379] [0.029]
Population in 1,000,000 −3.493** −0.945 −2.028
(1.693) (2.694) (4.065)
Share under 20 4.963 −6.406 20.972**
(3.642) (4.623) (8.100)
Share over 64 0.509 −5.374 −43.449**
(3.636) (5.530) (17.187)
GDP p.c. in 100,000 −2.576*** −4.251*** −2.085**
(0.343) (0.837) (0.820)
Unemployment rate 0.094** 0.065 0.073
(0.039) (0.042) (0.044)
Election year 0.010 0.001 0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Fiscal rule index 0.027 0.081 0.039
(0.044) (0.060) (0.056)
Mandatory fiscal referendum 0.026 0.108 0.100
(0.104) (0.095) (0.072)
Signature requirement initiative, relative −0.057 −0.007 −0.022
(0.057) (0.104) (0.100)
Cabinet size −0.029 0.027 −0.019
(0.053) (0.066) (0.069)
Parliament size 0.000 0.002 −0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Canton-specific effects Yes Yes Yes
Year-specific effects Yes Yes Yes
Canton-specific time trends No linear quadratic
Observations 728 728 728
Number of clusters 26 26 26
r2 0.92 0.94 0.95
notes: Dependent variable: Welfare expenditures in percent of GDP. OLS estimations. Average 
welfare expenditures in percent of GDP amount to 2.056. Standard errors in parentheses are 
adjusted for clustering at the level of cantons. p-values based on wild cluster bootstrap are 
reported in square brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Sources: Année politique Suisse, BAK Basel, cantonal constitutions, Feld et al. (2011), Funk 
and Gathmann (2011), Luechinger, Rosinger, and Stutzer (2007), Swiss Federal Finance 
Administration, Swiss Federal Statistical Office, and Swiss State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs
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and rents to special-interest groups in a probabilistic voting model with campaign 
contributions. Consistent with the main propositions of our model, we find in an 
empirical analysis for 26 Swiss cantons that lower voting costs due to postal vot-
ing are related to higher turnout and lower average education of participants as 
well as lower knowledge on the political issues they were deciding on. Moreover, 
we observe that the introduction of postal voting seems related to lower—and not 
higher—government welfare expenditures as well as to lower business tax rates.
Overall, we want to submit that high participation in democratic decision making 
is not a value in itself. Rather participants’ knowledge on the political decisions at 
stake is crucial. Lowering voting costs to increase participation might have rather 
negative side effects when special-interest groups are attracted that try to influence 
the less well informed in the voting population. Therefore, the focus should not only 



















Welfare expenditures in percent of GDP
Figure 4. Postal Voting and Welfare Expenditures of Swiss Cantons
notes: Coefficients (dots) and 95 percent confidence intervals (vertical lines) from an OLS 
regression of cantonal welfare expenditures in percent of cantonal GDP on dummies for 6 dif-
ferent time periods relative to the introduction of postal voting and a set of controls for the 
years 1980 to 2007. The dummies have the value one for the time period indicated on the x-axis 
and zero otherwise, with the time period five or more years prior to the introduction of postal 
voting normalized to zero (dashed line). The set of controls is the same as in specification III 
of Table 5. Confidence intervals are based on a cluster-robust estimator for the variance-cova-
riance matrix with clustering allowed at the cantonal level. Based on a Wald test, it is rejected 
that the mean of the two coefficients capturing the four years prior to the adoption of postal vot-
ing are equal to the mean of the two coefficients for the four years after ( p = 0.015).
Sources: Année politique Suisse, BAK Basel, cantonal constitutions, Feld et al. (2011), Funk 
and Gathmann (2011), Luechinger, Rosinger, and Stutzer (2007), Swiss Federal Finance 
Administration, Swiss Federal Statistical Office, and Swiss State Secretariat for Economic 
Affairs
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Mathematical Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3:
The interior solution of maximization problem (6) must satisfy the first-order 
condition
Table 6—Postal Voting and Business Tax Rates in Swiss Cantons for 1980 to 2007
(I) (II) (III)
Postal voting −0.548 −1.246** −0.729
(0.632) (0.595) (0.602)
[0.422] [0.074] [0.280]
Population in 1,000,000 −13.246 4.752 −77.436**
(13.879) (43.503) (28.748)
Share under 20 51.674* 122.587*** 82.535
(27.380) (39.720) (110.900)
Share over 64 45.122 −53.026 −26.440
(42.139) (86.301) (133.377)
GDP p.c. in 100,000 3.303 2.680 −3.880
(3.671) (6.305) (4.438)
Unemployment rate −0.070 0.302 0.152
(0.307) (0.279) (0.190)
Election year −0.088 −0.055 −0.071
(0.091) (0.093) (0.102)
Fiscal rule index −1.002 −0.258 −0.154
(0.594) (0.625) (0.686)
Mandatory fiscal referendum 0.683 0.174 −0.377
(0.797) (1.143) (0.537)
Signature requirement initiative, relative 0.224 −0.337 0.156
(0.573) (0.614) (0.509)
Cabinet size 0.262 0.473 0.060
(0.433) (0.409) (0.324)
Parliament size −0.022 −0.032** 0.004
(0.015) (0.014) (0.017)
Canton-specific effects Yes Yes Yes
Year-specific effects Yes Yes Yes
Canton-specific time trends No linear quadratic
Observations 728 728 728
Number of clusters 26 26 26
r2 0.68 0.81 0.87
notes: Dependent variable: Tax rate on net profits and capital (for net profits of CHF 400,000 
and a capital of CHF 2 millions). OLS estimations. Average business tax rates amount to 19.0. 
Standard errors are adjusted for clustering at the level of cantons. p-values based on wild clus-
ter bootstrap are reported in square brackets.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Sources: Année politique Suisse, BAK Basel, cantonal constitutions, Feld et al. (2011), Funk 
and Gathmann (2011), Luechinger, Rosinger, and Stutzer (2007), Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office, Swiss Federal Tax Authority, and Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
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(A1)  ∫ 2γ 1  α i [ − α i  ___α u′ ( c P i ) + H′( g P )] f  ( α i ) d α i = 0, 
where  c P i = (1 −  τ P ) α i and  τ P = ( g P +  ¯  r )/α . It is straightforward to show that 
the second-order condition holds. Denote the left-hand side of (A1) by  k r . Taking the 
derivative yields  ∂ k r /∂ g P =  ∫ 2γ 1 α i [ (− α i /α) 2 u″ ( c P i ) + H″( g P )] f  ( α i ) d α i < 0 . It 
follows from Leibniz’s rule that  ∂ k r /∂ γ = −4γ [(−2γ/α) u ′ ( c ̂P ) +  H ′ ( g P )] f(2γ) , 
where  c ̂P = (1 −  τ P )2γ . Observe further that  ∂ [−( α i /α)u′ ( c P i ) + H′( g P )] /∂ α i 
= −(1/α) [ u ′ ( c P i ) +  c P i u″ ( c P i ) ] = (1/α) u ′ ( c P i ) θ , which is strictly negative 
if  θ < 0 , and equal to zero if  θ = 0 . Therefore, we need to distinguish two 
cases. First, if  θ < 0 , it follows from (A1) and  2γ < 1 that  [−(2γ/α) u ′ ( c ̂P ) +  H ′ ( g P )] > 0 and, consequently,  ∂ k r /∂ γ < 0 . The implicit function theorem then 


















Figure 5. Postal Voting and Business Tax Rates in Swiss Cantons
notes: Coefficients (dots) and 95 percent confidence intervals (vertical lines) from an OLS 
regression of cantonal business tax rates on dummies for 6 different time periods relative to 
the introduction of postal voting and a set of controls for the years 1980 to 2007. The dummies 
have the value one for the time period indicated on the x-axis and zero otherwise, with the time 
period five or more years prior to the introduction of postal voting normalized to zero (dashed 
line). The set of controls is the same as in specification III of Table 6. Confidence intervals are 
based on a cluster-robust estimator for the variance-covariance matrix with clustering allowed 
at the cantonal level. Based on a Wald test, it cannot be rejected that the mean of the two coef-
ficients capturing the four years prior to the adoption of postal voting are equal to the mean of 
the two coefficients for the four years after ( p = 0.190).
Sources: Année politique Suisse, BAK Basel, cantonal constitutions, Feld et al. (2011), Funk 
and Gathmann (2011), Luechinger, Rosinger, and Stutzer (2007), Swiss Federal Statistical 
Office, Swiss Federal Tax Authority, and Swiss State Secretariat for Economic Affairs
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Second, if  θ = 0 , it follows that  [−(2γ/α) u ′ ( c ̂P ) +  H ′ ( g P )] = 0 ,  ∂ k r /∂ γ = 0 , 
 ∂ g P /∂ γ = 0 , and  ∂ τ P /∂ γ = 0 .  ∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
The interior solution of maximization problem (7) must satisfy the first-order 
condition
(A2)  ∫ 2γ 1 [ α i H ′ ( g P ) − (1 −  α i )Ω J ′ ( r P )] f  ( α i ) d α i = 0 . 
It is straightforward to show that the second-order condition 
holds. Denote the  left-hand side of (A2) by  k τ . Note that ∂ k τ /∂ g P 
=  ∫ 2γ 1 [ α i H″( g P ) + (1 −  α i )ΩJ″( r P )] f  ( α i ) d α i < 0. It then follows from Leib-
niz’s rule that  ∂ k τ /∂ γ = −2 f(2γ) [2γ H ′ ( g P ) − (1 − 2γ)ΩJ′( r P )] . Furthermore, 
observe that  ∂ [ α i H′( g P ) −  (1 −  α i )  ΩJ′( r P )] /∂ α i = H′( g P ) + ΩJ′( r P ) > 0 . It 
thus follows from (A2) and  2γ < 1 that  [2γH′( g P ) − (1 − 2γ)ΩJ′( r P )] < 0 
and, consequently,  ∂ k τ /∂ γ > 0 . The implicit function theorem then implies 
 ∂ g P /∂ γ > 0 . It follows that  ∂ r P /∂ γ < 0 .  ∎ 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
The interior solution of maximization problem (5) must satisfy the first-order 
conditions
(A3)  ∫ 2γ 1  [ − ( α i ) 2  ______α u′ ( c P i ) +  α i H′( g P )] f  ( α i ) d α i = 0 
and
(A4)  ∫ 2γ 1  [ − ( α i ) 2  ______α u′ ( c P i ) +  (1 −  α i ) ΩJ′( r P )] f  ( α i ) d α i = 0. 
It is straightforward to show that the second-order conditions hold. Denote the 
 left-hand side of (A3) by  k 1 , and the left-hand side of (A4) by  k 2 . It follows that 
 ∂ k 1 /∂ g P =  K u +  K H ,  ∂ k 2 /∂ g P = ∂ k 1 /∂ r P =  K u , and  ∂ k 2 /∂ r P =  K u +  K J , 
where  K u ≡  ∫ 2γ 1  [ ( α i ) 3 / α 2 ] u″ ( c P i ) f  ( α i ) d α i ≤ 0 ,  K H ≡ H″( g P ) ∫ 2γ 1  α i f  ( α i ) d α i 
< 0 , and  K J ≡ ΩJ″( r P ) ∫ 2γ 1  (1 −  α i )  f  ( α i ) d α i < 0 . Further it holds that 
 ∂ k 1 /∂ Ω = 0 and  ∂ k 2 /∂ Ω > 0 ; and it follows from Leibniz’s rule that ∂ k 1 /∂ γ 
= −2 [ (−4 γ 2 /α) u′( c ̂P )  +  2γ H′( g P )] f(2γ) and  ∂ k 2 /∂ γ = −2 [ (−4 γ 2 /α) u′( c ̂P )  + 
(1 − 2γ)ΩJ′( r P )] f(2γ) , where  c ̂P = (1 −  τ P )2γ .
The implicit function theorem states that
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∂ k 2  ___∂ r P       − 
∂ k 1  ___∂ r P 
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝
  ∂ k 1  ___∂ γ⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠
, with B ≡  [ ∂ k 1  ___∂ g P  
∂ k 2  ___∂ r P −  
∂ k 1  ___∂ r P  
∂ k 2  ___∂ g P ] 
−1
 .
 ∂ r P  ___∂ γ − ∂ k 2  ___∂ g P       
∂ k 1  ___∂ g P  
∂ k 2  ___∂ γ 
Hence,
(A5)  ∂ g P  ___∂ γ = 2B f (2γ) { K u [2γ H′( g P ) − (1 − 2γ)ΩJ′( r P )] 
 +  K J [ −4 γ 2  _____α u′( c ̂P ) + 2γH′( g P )] } ,
(A6)  ∂ r P  ___∂ γ = 2B f (2γ) { K u [(1 − 2γ)ΩJ′( r P ) − 2γH′( g P )] 
 +  K H [ −4 γ 2  _____α u′( c ̂P ) + (1 − 2γ)ΩJ′( r P )] } ,
and, consequently,
(A7)  ∂ ( g P +  r P )________ ∂ γ = 2B f (2γ) { K J [ −4 γ 
2  _____α u′( c ̂P ) + 2γH′( g P )] 
 +  K H [ −4 γ 2  _____α u′( c ̂P ) + (1 − 2γ)ΩJ′( r P )] } .
We first prove the results on  g P +  r P and  τ P . We know that  K J < 0 and  K H < 0 , 
and it is easy to show that  B > 0 . Hence it remains to determine whether the two 
terms in square brackets in (A7) are positive or negative. As shown in the proof 
of Proposition 3, it holds that  ∂ [−( α i /α)u′ ( c P i ) + H′( g P )] /∂ α i ≤ 0 . It then fol-
lows from (A3) and  2γ < 1 that  [(−4 γ 2 /α)u′( c ̂P ) + 2γH′( g P )] ≥ 0 . It further 
holds that  ∂ [− ( ( α i ) 2 /α) u′ ( c P i ) +  (1 −  α i ) ΩJ′( r P )] /∂ α i = − ( α i /α) [2u′ ( c P i ) + 
 c P i u″ ( c P i ) ] − ΩJ′( r P ) < 0 , where the inequality holds because our assumption 
θ ≤ 0 implies  u′ ( c P i ) +  c P i u″ ( c P i ) ≥ 0 . It then follows from (A4) and  2γ < 1 
that  [(−4 γ 2 /α)u′( c ̂P ) + (1 − 2γ)ΩJ′( r P )] > 0 . Together with (A7), these results 
imply  ∂ ( g P +  r P )/∂ γ < 0 and, consequently, also  ∂  τ P /∂ γ < 0 .
We now prove the results on  r P . We know from above that  B > 0 ,  K u ≤ 0 , 
K H < 0 , and  [(−4 γ 2 /α)u′( c ̂P ) + (1 − 2γ)ΩJ′( r P )] > 0 . It then follows from (A6) that  ∂ r P /∂ γ < 0 if  [(1 − 2γ)ΩJ′( r P ) − γH′( g P )] ≥ 0 . Conditions (A3) and (A4) imply
(A8)  ∫ 2γ 1 [ (1 −  α i ) ΩJ′( r P ) −  α i H′( g P )] f  ( α i ) d α i = 0 . 
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Observe that  ∂ [ (1 −  α i ) ΩJ′( r P ) −  α i H′( g P )] /∂ α i = −ΩJ′( r P ) − H′( g P ) < 0 . 
Therefore condition (A8) and  2γ < 1 imply  [(1 − 2γ)ΩJ′( r P ) − 2γH′( g P )] > 0 . 
Consequently,  ∂ r P /∂ γ < 0 .
We finally prove the results on  g P . We know from above that  B > 0 ,  K J < 0 , 
and  K u ≤ 0 . In particular, it must hold that  K u < 0 if  θ > −1 , and  K u = 0 
if  θ = −1 . Further, we show above that  [2γH′( g P ) − (1 − 2γ)ΩJ′( r P )] < 0 ; 
and in the proof of Proposition 3 that  [(−2γ/α)u′( c ̂P ) + H′( g P )] > 0 if  θ < 0 , 
and  [(−2γ/α)u′( c ̂P ) + H′( g P )] = 0 if  θ = 0 . Hence it follows from (A5) that 
 ∂ g P /∂ γ < 0 if  θ = −1 , and  ∂ g P /∂ γ > 0 if  θ = 0 .  ∎ 
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